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Abstract
This paper analyses the implicationsof combiningdirect and representativeforms of worker
participation for business performance. Direct participationrefersto such things as quality control
circles, continuous improvementteams and other problem-solvinggroups, while representatwe
participation refers to joint consultationcommittees,includingthose betweenworks cauncds and
mem~. Ushg a 1994 SLUWYof first-tier automotivepm PMS in Europe, this paper finds
evidencethat better quality and Wormat.ionsharing result born having both forms of worker
participation than having one or the other. The sumy also shows that in the fist half of the 1990s,
there has been a rapid difision of direct participation (togetherwith a commitmentto employment
security) and a moderatediffusionof indirectpticipation mechanismsin the UK. While not mhng out
Iegislatiomthe paper concludesby drawing implicationsof this findingfor a f@her diffusionof these
practices through voluntary means.
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Oxford. Educated in economics,her recent research interests includeinter-firmrelationsand iabour-
managernentrelations m the ear industry. Major publications includePrices, quufity and must: inrer-
j?rm relations in Britain and Japan (1992 CambridgeUniversityPress), and Japanese Labour mtd
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Is worker participation good for business? This question loomslarge in 1990s Brix where
companiescontinue to fkce intenseoverseascompetition and livewith the prospect of EuropeanWorks
Councils spreading in Europe. This paper attempts to shed light on this question by focusingon the
synergywhich might result from havingboth direct and representativeforms of worker participation.
Direct participation refers to voicemechanismswhichenable individualemployeesto influencetheir
&y-today operations, such as quality control circles (QCCS),continuousimprovementteams, and
other problem-solvinggroups. Representativeparticipation is throughjoint consultationcornmittccs
(JCCS), includingthose betweenworks councilsand managemen! whichmay have vuying rights of
informatio~ consultation and codecision.
At least three distinct camps maybe identifiedin the debateover whetherworkerparticipation
is good for business or not. First, there are the adamant defkndersof managerialprerogative,who
argue that both types of employeevoiceare unneceswwyto run a god business. This camp is
authoritarian (Fernie and Metcalf 1995),and at best would use dowmvardcanrnunication (such as
company newsletters)but no other forms of employeeinvolvement. %x@ there are those who are in
favour of direct participation (QCCS,etc) because it harnesses individualemployees’skills and
knowledgeto the full, but are opposed to representativeparticipationespeciallyif it is to be imposedby
legislation (Marchingtonet al 1992,p.4 1). This camp is content that since the mm-liberal1980s, the
terms of the debate over industrial democracyhas shiiled from workers’right over coUcctive
reprewntation towards individualemployeemotivationand concernfor enterpriseefficiency. Lastly,
there are those who believethat good business petiormance can best be achievedby givingemployees
an influenceboth at the day-today operational leveland at the policy leveL This position is held by the
Involvementand Pardcipatioa Association (IPA) which advocatesan Industrial Partnership model. A
hallmark of the IPA model is this synergywhich might result hrn having both direct and representative
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forms of participation (TPA1997).’lle surveyof car componentplants in Europeexaminedin this
researchnote providesevidencein favour of the third view.
There is nothing new about the theoreticalarguments for this type of synergy,althoughthe
human resource managementliteraturedominatedby US writersgives it a slightly differentemphasis
from the one given in this researchnote. Recentempiricalstudiesof human resourcemanagement
identi~ a ‘bundle’or a packageof practices (includingdirect workerparticipation)which improvefirm
performance(e.g. Huselid 1995, McDuffie 1995). These innovativeor transformedwork practices are
adopted especiallyby firms which fiu internationalcompetition(Osterman 1994), such as in the car
indu~. There is ample empirical support for the synergisticrelationships,or complementarily
(Milgromand Roberts 1992),among such things as teamwox job rotatiou problem-solvinggroups,
and performance-relatedpay. The HR ‘bundle’examinedin the US, however,does not include
representativeparticipation. The latter is a separate policy conce~ arising out of a worry over the
decliningunion density and the correspondingincreasein the ‘representationgap’ (Kaufinanand
Kleiner 1993, Rogers and Streeck 1995). The main bridge providedbetweenthe work focusingon
human resourcs policy bundlesand the work on works councils in the US is the ‘mutualgains
enterprise’frameworkof Kochan and Osterman(1994,p.89). This gives unions (and perhaps other
representativeformaof employeevoice)a role in suQainingthe effectivenessof innovativeHR
practices once they are adopted. For example, ifmanagernen~under pressure to meeta production
targz is tempted to withdraw its commitmentto job rotation or quality circles, the union would put a
checkon such hasty withdrawal (Levineand Helper 1995). The case of Saturq a General Motors
p~ with w-management structures at all levelsof the organisatioq maybe consideredan example,
albeit atypical, of the synergistic link betweendirect and representativeforms of participation
(Rubinstein et al 1993).
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In Brita@ as in the US, much of tie recent interest in participationhas comehorn lookingat
the Japanese example. Problem-solvinggroups and continuousimprovementteams are considereda
central me of ‘1= production’which must be adopted if companiesare to survive in international
markets (Wornacket al 1990). Directworker participationfor enterpriseefficiencyexists = a common
feature in Japanese transplants in Britain and the US. But while US-basedJapanese transplants remain
mainly non-unionwith fewer representativeparticipatmy mechanisms(Helperforthemning),Bnt:sh-
based Japanese tlnns have had joint eonsuhationeomrnitteesas part of the single-unionded (Bassett
1986). However, even in BritahLthe emulatorsof Japanesetransplants have foeussedmainlyon
adopting direet participato~ praetiees on the shopfloorwithout much regard to the support mechanism
off the shopfloor (Oliverand WiIkinson 1992). In contrast in JapU direct paticipationj whichhas
difised widely, is typiedly complementedby joint consultationbetweenemployeerepresentativesand
managementboth at the plant and enterprise levels(Nakamura 1997).Managementhas had an
incentiveto implementjoint emndtation to conductthe annual wagenegotiations,and to demonstrate
to workers that stmtegic deeisionsare made without eomprornisingtheir commitmentto employment
security.
This paper is stmtured as follows. Fi@ the hypothesisconcerningthe synergybetweendirect
and representativeforms of employeevoice is put to empirie.altesL using a survey of automotive
componentsupplier plants in Europe. SeeonrLwe examinehow WidCSpl%ildboth fOrmSOfemplOy=
voice are in Britain as comparedto the rest of Europe, using the same sumy evidenec. The paper
eonchdes by drawing some implicationsfor policy and practiec.
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Is There Synergy between Direct and Representative Forms of Employee Voice?
A l~ge-serde postal stmey of first-tier automotivecomponentplants was canductedby the
author in 1994 in collaborationwith Susan Helperof Case WesternReseme Universityand wmhthe
sponsorship of the InternationalMotor VehicleProgram (IMVP)(it will be referredto as the w
survey in this note throughout). We obtainedvalid responsesfrom 221 plants, half(114) of whichwere
located in Briti and the other half in the rest of Europe (predorninmly in Germany,France, Italy and
Spain). This constituteda responserate of 25% in Britain and 13% in the rest of Europe. Due to a
relativelylow response rate, results must be interpretedwith caution. In particular, the results are
biassed towards larger-sizedplants.
In order to assess whetheremployeevoicehaa business benefits,the three viewsalluded to
earlier are repeatedhere, rephmsed in ways whichcan be examinedusing the survey data. The fist
view (the ‘authoritarian’view)says that neitherdirect nor indirectforms of worker participation
matters for plant performance. Accordingto the secondview (the direct participationview),direct
participation is what matters for plant performamz; the corollary is that representativepanicipation is
irrelevantor evendamging @cause it adds an ~sary burden to business overheads). The third
view (the synergyview) states that both direct participationand representativepticipation are
necessary to bring about good plant performance.
hotiti&titid~ of&= ktim, tiW_qle-titidd hmfou
groups plants with quali~ cmtrol circles (QCCS)but withoutjoint eonauhtion committees(JCCS);
those with JCCS but without QCCS;those with both QCCSand JCCS;and those with neither. (The
presenceof QCCSwas definedhere as ‘Qua@ Circles, uminuous improvementgroups, employee
involvementgroups, or other problem-solvingactivities’ in which50°Aor more of the eligible
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employeestook part. JCCS are joint Iabour-managementcommitteesor employeeeanmittecs with
reprewntatives who are eitherehxted or appointedby management.) This four-wayclassfieation of
the sample is used to examine if the plant performanceis significantlydifferentin the four groups. The
xamination is quality, as measuredby the propornon of productspetiormmx indicator seiectedfor e
shipped to the customer which are rejectedor voluntarilyrecalled. As is evidentin Figure 1, there is no
suppofi for the ‘authoritarian’view; signifimt differencesexist betweenplants with neitherQCCSnor
JCCSand those with at least one of these participatory practices. & betweenthe two other views,
there is greater support for the synergyviewon hvo acmunts. First eventhose plants with JCCSbut
without QCCS(the seeondbar in the Figure)do better than those with neither,counteringthe argument
that representativeparticipation may be irrelevantor damagingto plant performance. Also, m direct
support of the synergyview, combiningQCCSand JCCS improvesquality over and above hawngpt
direct participation.
@JSERT FIGURE 1ABOUT HERE]
How ean this result be best interpreted? In order to answer this questio~ we needto
understand what is happening to employees’willingnessto share their ideas with managementwhen
QCCS and JCCS are implemented. It is often said that employeeinvolvementimprovescommunication
and the quality of decisionmaking in an organisation. But fromthe employees’viewpoint beii asked
to take past in QCCSwithout representativeparticipation for higher-levelissues is like being asked to
contribute without having a‘ red say’. If representativeparticipationthrough JCCSis combinedwith
direct ~cipati~ employeesare more likelyto fkelthat their voice is hear~ and only then are they
ding to give their hearts and minds to QCC-type activities.
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This line of argument sounds all too plausible, but is rarely subjeetedto empiriealtests. The
IMVP survey is able to shed light on an aspeet of what is going on. In the survey, plant managerswere
asked to show their degreeof agreementwith the statement: ‘workerssometimesfbelreluetantto share
their ideas about improvedwork methodswith management.’As shown m Figure 2, at least according
to just over 200 Europeanear supplier plants, such reiuetaneeon the part of workers 1shighestwhen
plants have neither QCCSnor JCCS. Havingeither QCCSor JCCSgoes a long way to reducingworker
reluctanceto share their ideas, but the best strategy is to combinethe WOforms of participation.(1)
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUTHERE]
How and Why is Worker Participation Spreading?
If worker participation has business benefits, and if managersare aware of such benefits, that
creates a necessarye.onditionfor the di.flhsionof participatorypractices. Of the two ‘ifs’, the first one
was already addressed in the last section. What about the seeond‘if? The related surveysof the
IMVP are able to provide a clue.
The questionnaireasked the respondentshow importanteach of a list of eight iternswas in their
manufacturing m. The rankingof the items accordingto the proportion of those who said they
were important or extremelyimportant is shown in Table 1. In the ~ ‘increaseemployee
involvement’emergedas the most imports@ followedby’ improvequality’, ‘redueeoverhead’,and
‘reduceinvento~.’ Of course, these items are not mutually exclusive,and it is quite likelythat
employeeinvolvementis important to achievebetter quality and reduceinventory. Moreover, it was not
made explicit what was to be includedin employeeinvolvern@ so that some respded with tiy
problem-solvinggroups in mind whileothers had tbancial participation or representativeparticipation
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inmind. However,what is clear is that UK managers fklt that employeeinvolvementwas of utmost
importance,whilemanagers in the US and the rest of Europeconsideredit of less importance.
Interestingly,Japanese managers consideredemployeeinvolvementof least importance,either because
it has been diffused for a fewdecadesalready (thus losing the marginal improvementwhich could be
derivedfrom it), or because it has actually lost its effectivenesswith the shorteningof modelcycles, the
advances in technicalknowledgenecessaryon the part of workers to make relevantsuggestions,and the
deciinein the quality of shopfloor Iabour.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUTHERE]
Given that British numagers in the car componentsindustry werehighly aware of the
importanceof employeeinvolvementin improvingtheir manufacturingstrategy, it is not surprising to
find that more and more plants are adoptingparticipatorypractices. The Ih4VPsumcy asked plant
managerswhethertheir plants had the two forms of participationat the time of the sumy (in 1994)and
4 years prior to the survey (in 1990). & shown in Figure 3, the propornon of British plants with direct
participation rose from 3’%0in 1990to 34’%0in 1994, rising at a much fister rate than in the rest of
Europe. Ln1994, British piants are significantlymore likelyto have problemsolvinggroups (such as
QCCS)than other European plants. By contra% non-UKplants are more likelyto havejoint
cxxlsultationCommhteeathan UK plants, perhaps becauseof the relativeabsenceof legislationin this
area in the UK (see Figure 4). Nevertheless,even in the w there hss been a slow, creepingincrease
in meetingsbetweenmanagementand employeerepresentatives,at both unionisedand non-unionised
WOf’k@US (nOtC tbt 80°AOfb p- in the SSIIQkSfell!hlkd).
[INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4 ABOUTHERE]
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At the same time, managementcommitmentto employmentsecurity is also spreadingmore
rapidly in Britain than in the rest of Europe (see Figure 5). The tMVP sumy asked plant managers
whethertheir plants had a ‘policyof no layoffs resultingfrom productivityincreases’. This is a limited
form of guaranteeingemploymentsecurity, whichaddressesworkers’ feaxof doing themselvesout of a
job by workingharder or making productivity-enhancingsuggestions.Employmentsecurity rareIy
meansjobs for life. Nor does managementmake a mnrnibnent neverto lay off any workersunder any
circumstances. This is why this practice is prone to be criticisedfor beinga ‘goodtimes only’ policy,
The test of such a policy is indeedin a downtun whenthe employershould be seen to be makingevery
effort to avoid layoffs. It is not the ultimate absenceof layoffs, but employees’perceptionof the firm’s
degreeof effort in avoiding them whichmatters. Thus, in Japan (the country of liftie employment)
and at Japanese companies in Brita@ someworkerswere made redundantin the early 1990srecession,
but most companieswereable to preseme the normof liftie employment. This retentionof
managementcarunitment in the eyes of the employeeswas much helpedby their having a
representativeform of employeeparticipation. It is undoubtable easier to showthat layoffs area last
resort and retain workers’ confidencein managementby allowingemployeesto be party to a discussion
on corporate petiormance than excludingthem from such discussion.
~SERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
To mmarize the survey evidence,managementcommitmentto employmentsecurity is
fPW’@ ti MOI’Cpl@s kve ildoptd direct ~d representativeforms of participation in Europe.
Compared to plants in the rest of Europe, British plants have been moreprone to make commitmentto
employmentsecurity and to implementproblem solvinggroups, but less prone to set up joint
cmsultion committees. In the mid-1990s,however,only lS’%of plants in the sumy (14Y0of UK
and 16°Aof other European plants) had both forms of worker participation.
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Implications for Policy and Practice
To conclude,this paper argued that the business benefitof employeevoice comesflom
employees’willingnessto share their ideas with management. This willingnessis greater if direct and
representativeforms of participation are combinedthan if one or the other is used. The IMVP sumey
in Europe also showedthat without the force of legislatio~ both direct and representatweforms of
employeevoice are spreading in the British automotiveparts supply industry. One main driver behind
the difision at Ieast of direct piuticipation is the managers’beliefthat employeeinvolvementis of
utmost importance in improvingtheir manufacturingperformance.
In the automotive industry today, however,there is no ecmsensuson the one best way of
improvingmanuheturing performancein the ear industIY. Take cost reduetionas an objective. One
possible poiiey to achievethis objectivewould be to reduc%the number of employees,or to switch to
suppliers who offer cheaperprices, and perhaps also reduceunit costs by exploitingeeonomiesof scale.
This is the conventionalmass productionapproach which maybe eidledthe exit modelbeeause the
emphasis is on terminatingeontraets with employeesand suppliers. An alternativepolicy would be to
work together with exisdng employees,customers, amdsuppliers to think of ways of reducingcosts.
This may be called the voiec model (Helper 1997).Exit certainlyhas the merit of bringing about
efficiencysavings immolate“ ly. But voiec is more likelyto lead to better eommunieatioq and the
resuhing richer flow of informationfheilitateslong-lastingimprovementsin manukturing
performance. Hirdman ‘s (1970)exit-voicehnework has givesimuch insight into the efieaey of
employeevoice ndmisma such as the union (Freemanand Medoff 1984). However,as Freemanand
Medoff no@ the effi~ of voicedependaon the way in which Iabourand managementinteraets,
rather than whether unions exist or not. In the same veiq QCCSor works eouacils are likelyto
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fimctionin difYerentways not only in differentcountrycontexts (Rogersand Streeck 1995)but also
from firm to &m. This researchnote fmssed on the synergybehveendirect and representative
.
participation in an attempt to gauge the process of interactionbetweenmanagementand labour, and in
panticuhr how differenttypes of voicemechanismscan be combinedto maximiseemployees’incentives
to canmunicate and impart ideas to management.
Lookingat the diffusionof workerparticipation in the British car @mponentsupply industry,
it might be tempting to concludethat at least in this industry subjectedto fierce international
competitio~ market and technologicalforcesare sui%cientto producea natural evolutionarydifision
of participatory practices. However,it is difficult to tell born cross-sectionalor pseudo-longitudinal
sumys whetherpractices in place today will be sustainedovertime. Those in favour of legislatingfor
representativeparticipation argue that in the absenceof Iegislatio%attrition rates of participatory
practices would be very high as they would be based on the withdrawablegoodwilland the volatile
sense of expediencyon the part of empioyers. Employersmay also find it too costly to adopt a
participatory schemewhenothers in the same industry do not have it; moreover,even if worker
participation improvesthe overall plant performance,the resulting incrwe in workers’bargaining
power may lead to a smaller share of the total value added for management(Levine 1995). Thus,
legislationis seen as both a means of cr=ting a critical mass of firms with worker Participation and a
way of making sure that omx adopti itwould be sustainedovertime, The IMVP surveyevidenceof
a rapid dii%isionof worker participation may indicateany of the tbllowing. Either, this is a fad
associated with attempts at learningfrom Jqxq whichwouldend with high attrition rates by the next
recession. ~,it~tie -ofamhti atim-tixonof~~ve
as well as direct participatim which would becomesustainableoncea majorityhas such a system in
place. Japanese indudal firms have travelledthis latter route of voluntary adoption for both theirjoint
consultation canmittees and their quality control circles.
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Notes
1. The orderedprobit regressionresult to back up this conclusionis as follows.
INFREL = kQC, JC, QC*JC)
where INFREL = ‘Workerssometimesfkelreluctant to share their ideasabout improvedwork methcds
with management’(I=strongly disagree; 5=stronglyagree).
QC = QCCSwithout JCC
JC = JCC without QCCS
Ordered Probit Estimates Number of obs = 214
chi2(3) = 13.43
Prob > chi2 = 0.0038
Log Likelihood = -296.39045 Pseudo R2 = 0.0222
INFR.ELI Coef. Std. Err. z p>{zl [95% Coti. Interval]
--------- +------------------------------------------------------------------------
JC I -.3903246 .1749455 -2.231 0.026 -.7332114 -.0474378
QC I -.8006174 .2398099 -3.339 0.001 -1.270636 -.3305987
JC*QC I -.5801903 .2315901 -2.505 0.012 -1.034099 -.126282
..-.— + —---. —-—----——--—
Moreover, there is Mther evidenceof intensiveuse of tiormation whenboth direct and representative
participation are present. In particular, plants with both QCCSand JCC agree more with the statement
‘Wealways use data regaling sources of defkctsin part productionto mOd@our processes’than the
plants with either QCCSor JCC.
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Table 1: Important Factors in the Manufacturing Strategy of Auto Parts SuppIiers
‘/0Important and Extremely important
(Ranking in brackets)
Factors UK Rest of Europe USA Japan
Increase 96.64 (1) 79.86 (4) 90.12 (2) 47.80 (8)
employee
involvement
Improve quality 90.83 (2) 86.53 (1) 91.35 (1) 95.70 (1)
Reduce 83.34 (3) 80.34 (3) 81.74 (3) 89,09 (2)
overhead
Reduce 81.35 (4) 78,42 (5) 80,60 (4) 83,33 (6)
inventory
Develop new 78,82 (5) 85.62 (2) 69.64 (5) 88.63 (3)
products
Product 59.13 (6) 61.70 (6) 62.21 (6) 78.78 (7)
simplification/
standardiition
Increase 38.99 (7) 51.80(8) 57.43 (7) 84.52 (5)
automation
Reduce wage 36.75 (8) 61.43 (7) 52.52 (8) 86.43 (4)
growth
Source: IMVP Supptier Surveys
N.B. The questionnaire asked: ‘In your businessunit’s manufacturingstrategy, what has been
the importance of the followingfactors?’ Respondents were asked to indicate the degree of
importance on a 5-point scale for each of the eight items listed.
Figure 1
Combining JCC and QCC Improves Quality
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Direct Participation
Problem solving groups with over 50% partici~ation
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